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Abstract In order to e↵ectively communicate information, the choice of rep-
resentation is important. Ideally, a chosen representation will aid readers in
making desired inferences. In this paper, we develop the theory of observation:
what it means for one statement to be observable from another. Using observ-
ability, we give a formal characterization of the observational advantages of
one representation of information over another. By considering observational
advantages, people will be able to make better informed choices of representa-
tions of information. To demonstrate the benefit of observation and observa-
tional advantages, we apply these concepts to set theory and Euler diagrams.
In particular, we can show that Euler diagrams have significant observational
advantages over set theory. This formally justifies Larkin and Simon’s claim
that “a diagram is (sometimes) worth ten thousand words”.
1 Introduction
When we want to share and understand information, we need to represent
it in some notation. There is a plethora of notations available to us for this
purpose. Even when a notation has been selected, we must still choose how to
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use its syntax to represent the desired information. This paper is concerned
with the relative advantages of one choice of representation of information
over another. Many factors can contribute to such advantages. For instance,
graphical features, such as the way in which colour is used, and visual clutter
(or lack thereof) can impact on the ease with which information can be ex-
tracted from a representation. The particular focus of this paper is on what
we call observational advantages; this term, and others, illustrated informally
in the early sections of this paper, will be formalized at appropriate points as
we proceed.
As a simple example, suppose we wish to represent these two facts about
three sets, P , Q and R: nothing is in both P and Q, and everything in R
is also in P . There are many notations that can express this information:
five examples are illustrated in Figure 1. The first two are sentential and the
Fig. 1 Multiple choices of representation.
last three are diagrammatic. There is little syntactic di↵erence between (1),
the set theory representation, and (2), the description logic representation [1].
Both utilize two statements1 to express the desired information. Each of these
statements has a single meaning-carrying relationship. By meaning-carrying
relationship we mean a relation on the syntax of the statement that carries
semantics and evaluates to either ‘true’ or ‘false’. Thus, the idea of meaning-
carrying relationship is similar to what Shin referred to as ‘representing fact’ in
her seminal work on the systems of Venn diagrams [20]. It plays an important
role in both our work as well as hers. The first statements in (1) and (2)
assert that the intersection of the two sets is empty. The meaning-carrying
relationship in (1), and similarly for (2), is that (P \ Q) and ; are written
either side of =. The statement (P \Q) = ; evaluates to either true or false,
depending on the interpretation of P and Q as sets. The second statements in
(1) and (2) describe a subset relationship; here, the meaning carrier in (1) is
that R is written on the left of ✓ and P is written on the right.
1 By statement, we mean a syntactic entity (in any representation system) that represents
some information. For example, a set-theoretic sentence is a single statement, and so is an
Euler diagram.
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Representation (3) is an existential graph [6,15], comprising of two com-
ponents. The top-most component expresses the disjointness of P and Q. It is
directly read as ‘it is not the case that something is in both P and Q’, since
the closed curve, called a cut, represents negation and the line represents the
existence of an element in the sets denoted by its end points. The second com-
ponent reads ‘it is not the case that something is in R and not in P .’ Like the
two sentential representations, each component of the existential graph has a
single meaning-carrying relationship. The top component’s meaning carrier is
the relationship that P–Q is enclosed by the cut. The bottom component has
a similar meaning carrier: the inner part is enclosed by the outer-most cut.
The other two representations of this information each comprise a single
statement which hasmany meaning-carrying relationships. Representation (4),
the Euler diagram, uses non-overlapping curves to express the disjointness of
P and Q and, similarly, curve containment to assert that R is a subset of P ;
note that our use of Euler diagrams does not assume any existential import
– present regions can represent empty sets. Here, two meaning-carrying rela-
tionships (namely, disjointness and containment) are exploited to convey the
desired information. As a consequence of the way in which Euler diagrams
are formed, additional meaning-carrying relationships are evident. Most obvi-
ously, the non-overlapping relationship between Q and R is a meaning carrier.
Thus, from the Euler diagram we can observe the statement that Q and R
are disjoint. By contrast, this statement cannot be observed from (1), (2) or
(3) but must be inferred from the statements given. This is an example of an
observational advantage of the Euler diagram over the previous three represen-
tations of this information. The linear diagram [5], used in representation (5),
has similar advantages. This diagram represents the sets using lines. One line
completely overlapping with another represents a subset relationship and lines
with no overlap represent disjoint sets. Again, we can see that through repre-
senting the desired information, the linear diagram also allows us to observe
that Q and R are disjoint.
Thus, among the five notations in Figure 1, three allow only one meaning-
carrying relationship per statement, while two allow multiple meaning-carrying
relationships per statement. This di↵erence in the design of notations makes
a crucial di↵erence to what can and cannot be observed from a statement,
and thus to the cognitive values of notational systems. We will return to this
point later when we discuss observational properties of notations in a more
systematic manner. Here, we only note that this di↵erence between single and
multiple meaning carriers should not suggest any sharp dichotomy of sentential
and diagrammatic notations, as is clear from the example of existential graphs
that allow only one meaning carrier per statement.
Representations of information that allow statements to be observed as
true, without the need for inference, can be considered advantageous. In this
paper, through developing the theory of observation and observational advan-
tages, we provide a framework in which relative benefits of one representation
of information over another can be characterized and understood. Our formal
account will lead to more informed choices when representing information: we
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will be able to advantageously exploit the use of meaning-carrying relation-
ships when considering the information that end-users may wish to derive.
We demonstrate how to apply our theory of observation and observational
advantages to set theory and Euler diagrams. These notations have been se-
lected for a number of reasons. First, Euler diagrams form the basis of many
visualization techniques that have been employed for representing informa-
tion, such as Bubble Sets [4], EulerView [22,21], iCircles [23], and KelpFu-
sion [14]. They also form the basis of a number of diagrammatic logics, such
as Euler/Venn [26], spider diagrams [10], and constraint diagrams [11]. Their
prominent role in both information visualization and diagrammatic reasoning
makes our case study particularly relevant to these areas. Moreover, set the-
ory is widely understood and is a contrasting notation to Euler diagrams. Its
syntactically similar nature to description logic, used for ontology engineering,
means that many of our arguments about set theory readily adapt to descrip-
tion logic. Lastly, by comparing set theory and Euler diagrams, we are able to
show that the latter have numerous observational advantages over the former.
That is, we provide a theoretical way of capturing the often seen observational
advantages of diagrams over sentential systems.
The paper is structured as follows. We develop the theory of observation
in Section 3, including the concepts of observational completeness and obser-
vational devoidness. The idea of an observational advantage is presented in
Section 4. After this, the theory of observation is developed for set theory
and Euler diagrams. Section 5 presents the formalization of these two nota-
tions. The circumstances under which information can be observed from set-
theoretic sentences and Euler diagrams are given in Section 6. We demonstrate
that set-theoretic sentences are observationally devoid in Section 7, where we
also establish that Euler diagrams are observationally complete. As a conse-
quence, Euler diagrams have many observational advantages over set-theoretic
sentences, shown in Section 8. We conclude and discuss future directions in
Section 9. Proofs for all of the lemmas and theorems can be found in the
supplementary material.
2 Background
Our research is concerned with producing a theory of observation in order to
formalize the idea of an observational advantage. Our motivation is to allow
more informed choices to be made when choosing representations of informa-
tion. By choosing representations with beneficial observational advantages, we
reduce the need for inference and, consequently, proof systems. Prior work
has used the idea of observation, and the related idea of free-rides, within the
context of defining proof systems.
Indeed, the main tool of our analysis is the concept of observation, which
has been formalized as an inference rule in proof systems [2,26]. Roughly, this
inference rule lets us focus on one of the pieces of information expressed in a
statement and re-express it in another statement. This may seem trivial be-
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cause such an inference rule, by definition, adds no information to a proof that
has not been already expressed in a previous statement. This is particularly
true for a proof involving only sentential representations. Many sentences sup-
port a unique ‘meaning-carrying relationship’ and, thus, when the observation
rule is applied to such a sentence, it ends up restating its unique meaning in an
identical or synonymous sentence. This does not constitute significant progress
in a proof. Since proof-theoretic studies have been predominantly done using
sentential proofs, the concept of observation has never played an important
theoretical role.
The situation is very di↵erent in a proof involving diagrammatic represen-
tations. While a sentence often has only one meaning-carrying relationship, a
diagram typically has many meaning-carrying relationships, as demonstrated
in Figure 1 and discussed in Section 1. Thus, the observation rule applied to a
diagram can yield many di↵erent statements, depending upon which meaning-
carrying relationship it operates. This makes observation an interesting rule
in the realm of diagrammatic proofs, since the choice of statements observed
in this step could change the course of a proof entirely.
For this reason, Barwise and Etchemendy’s Hyperproof [2] incorporated the
observation rule in their hybrid system of proofs involving both pictorial dia-
grams of a blocks world and first-order sentences. Swoboda and Allwein [26]
were more conscious about the di↵erence between the observation rule and
other inference rules. Drawing upon Dretske’s classification of various cases
that are commonly described as “somebody’s seeing that something is the
case” [7], Swoboda and Allwein called for the distinctive treatment of the ob-
servation rule, which consists of visual perception and the restatement of the
information thus obtained, from other rules that require observational opera-
tions that go beyond perception and restatement. This way, we can investigate
the observational advantages of a statement in a proof-theoretic manner, by
identifying the set of statements observable from it, as opposed to those state-
ments that must be inferred. This approach is particularly important if we are
to investigate the observational advantages of visual representations in general,
including both diagrammatic and sentential representations.
In fact, this approach is suited to clarify how the ‘free ride’ capacities of
diagrams [17,18] influence their observational advantages. In a diagrammatic
system, expressing chosen information in a diagram often results in the ex-
pression of other pieces of information that are consequences of the chosen in-
formation; informally, these other pieces of information are free rides. We will
shortly see an example of such a free ride in the case of Euler diagrams, while
many other diagrammatic systems, including systems of maps, line drawings,
and geometry diagrams, also have this capacity [3,8,12]. When such free rides
occur, the task of inferring consequential information from the given premises
is replaced by the task of expressing the premises in diagrams and observing
the consequences that are automatically expressed there. Using diagrams in
this way lets us obtain consequential information with little inferential e↵ort,
giving ‘free rides’ to the consequences. As is clear from this description, the
main force of a free ride consists of the fact that the diagram has a number of
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consequences observable from it, not just inferable from it. Thus, an analysis
based on the observation rule is essential to formally capture the advantages
(and disadvantages) relating to inference brought about by free rides.
Specifically in terms of set theory2 and Euler diagrams (the focus of the
case study later in this paper) it has long been believed that the latter have
advantages, relating to inference, over the former. Recent work, such as [16],
has empirically established that inference tasks are performed more accurately
with Euler (and Venn) diagrams than when using sentential representations.
However, there has been no previous attempt at theoretically classifying such
advantages of Euler diagrams over set theory. The theory of observation and
observational advantages developed in this paper allows us to formally address
the adage ‘a picture is worth a thousand words’, directly related to diagrams
in [12], by quantifying rigorously the observational advantages of Euler dia-
grams over set theory.
3 Observation of Information
Generally, a visual representation, be it a diagram or a written sentence, ex-
presses meaning by having symbols standing in a certain visual or spatial
relationship. For example, a metro map expresses the information that Pic-
cadilly Circus is directly connected to Green Park by having a node labelled
‘Piccadilly Circus’ connected to a node labelled ‘Green Park’ with a line, as
shown in Figure 2. An Euler diagram expresses the information that P is a
subset of Q by having the curve labelled P included inside the curve labelled
Q. Similarly, the set-theoretic sentence P \ R ✓ Q expresses the information
that P intersection R is a subset of Q by having labels P , Q, and R standing
in a certain spatial relationship mediated by the special symbols \ and ✓.
Green Park
Piccadilly
Circus
Leicester Square
Fig. 2 Observing information from a metro map.
When a statement,  , expresses a certain meaning by having a visuo-spatial
relationship,  , among its syntactic elements, we call   a meaning-carrying
relationship in  . Note that the term ‘meaning’ in this definition is confined to
what is sometimes called an ‘assertive content,’ a piece of information asserted
by a statement that evaluates to either true or false in an interpretation. For
example, the information that Piccadilly Circus is directly connected to Green
Park counts as a meaning of the metro map in Figure 2, as it is an assertive
2 By the term ‘set theory’ we mean a symbolic representation of sets, such as P \Q, and
the assertion of relationships between sets, such as P \Q ✓ R.
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content of the metro map in Figure 2 — if it were not true, the map would be
considered inaccurate, at least partially. Thus, the visuo-spatial relationship
holding in the metro map responsible for the expression of this information
counts as a meaning-carrying relationship. By contrast, consider the ‘meaning’
of the leftmost node, labeled ‘Green Park,’ in the map. Although the node
denotes the Green Park station, its denotation does not count as a meaning
in our terminology, since stations are not the kind of things to which truth
and falsehood can be attributed and therefore not the kind of things whose
truth can be asserted. Accordingly, the visuo-spatial relationship with which
that node denotes the Green Park station — that is, the fact that it is a black
circle with the label “Green Park” in its spatial proximity — does not count
as a meaning-carrying relationship.
Similarly, the denotation of the term P \ R in the set-theoretic sentence
P \ R ✓ Q does not count as a meaning, since, again, the intersection of the
sets P and R is not the kind of thing to which truth or falsehood can be
attributed. Accordingly, the visuo-spatial relationship that enables this term
to denote the relevant set — that is, the fact that the labels P and R have the
symbol \ in between — does not count as a meaning-carrying relationship in
this set-theoretic sentence. The meaning-carrying relationship in it is rather
the fact that the term P \ R is to the left of the letter Q over the symbol ✓,
since the information carried by this relationship — that is, that P intersection
R is a subset of Q — is a piece of information asserted by the set-theoretic
sentence that evaluates to either true or false in an interpretation.
What we call observation selects some of these meaning-carrying relation-
ships holding in a representation and produces another representation that
supports just enough relationships to express the meanings carried by the
selected relationships and nothing stronger. Take the Euler diagram d in Fig-
ure 3, for example. Observation may select the spatial relationship between
the curves labelled P and Q in d and produce d1. When observation selects
the spatial relationship between the curves labelled P and R in d, it produces
d2. Similarly, d3 is the result of observation operating on the spatial relation-
ship between curves labelled R and Q in d. In each of these cases, observation
operates on a ‘local’ meaning-carrying relationship involving just two of la-
belled curves and results in semantically weaker diagrams. If it operates on
the relationship among all three labelled curves, it results in d itself. Thus, d1,
d2, d3, and d itself are all observable from d. By contrast, d4 is not observable
from d, even though it is semantically entailed3 by d. By including the curve
labelled S, d4 supports extra visuo-spatial relationships that are not necessary
to express the meaning that is carried by any visuo-spatial relationships in d.
In some cases, observation produces a set-theoretic sentence out of an Euler
diagram. For example, it may operate on the spatial relationship between the
curves labelled P and Q in d and produce the set-theoretic sentence P \Q = ;.
Note that syntactic elements P , Q, =, and ; stand in a certain spatial rela-
3 We use the term semantically entailed in the standard, model theoretic way: one set of
statements, ⌃, semantically entails a single statement,  , if all the models for ⌃ are models
for  .
8 Gem Stapleton et al.
Fig. 3 Observing information from Euler diagrams.
tionship in this set-theoretic sentence, and this relationship is just enough to
express the meaning carried by the spatial relationship of the curves labelled
P and Q in d. When operating on the spatial relationships between di↵er-
ent pairs of curves in d, observation may produce the set-theoretic sentences
R ✓ P and R\Q = ;. This is analogous to the ways the diagrams d1, d2, and
d3 are observed from d.
All of these are examples of observation applied to an Euler diagram to
produce another statement, be it a diagram or a set-theoretic sentence. But
observation can also be applied to a set-theoretic sentence to produce another
set-theoretic sentence or an Euler diagram. Observation works in a similar way
in these cases too, which we discuss next.
What is special about set-theoretic sentences, and sentences in many natu-
ral or artificial languages, is the fact that a whole sentence, rather than a part
of it, often determines its meaning-carrying relationship. Thus, even though
label R is connected to label Q with the symbol ✓ in the set-theoretic sentence
P \R ✓ Q, this spatial relationship is not a meaning carrier in this sentence.
For if it were, we could read o↵ the information that R is a subset of Q from
this sentence, which is clearly not valid. Indeed, reinstating the omitted brack-
ets, which should formally be present, the set-theoretic sentence P \ R ✓ Q
becomes (P \R) ✓ Q. This latter presentation more clearly delineates R from
the special symbol ✓, indicating that it is the whole of the left hand side of ✓
that is asserted to be a subset of Q. By the same token, the same relationship
cannot be a meaning carrier in the set-theoretic sentence P [ R ✓ Q even
though, in this case, the information one would extract happens to be a valid
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conclusion of what is expressed by the entire sentence.4 Thus, in the case of
set-theoretic sentences, we are simply not supposed to focus our attention on
a partial structure of the given sentence and extract information out of it.
Rather, we are to parse the entire structure of the sentence and read o↵ the
meaning carried by that structure.
This is in contrast to our reading practices for most diagrams. To extract
information from a metro map, one does not need to parse its entire structure.
Just focusing on a particular pair of nodes and the edge connecting them,
one can read o↵ meaning, and allowing such a ‘partial’ reading is a function
of the metro map. Focusing on other pairs of nodes (or sets of nodes), one
obtains other meanings. Many meaning-carrying relationships hold in a metro
map, and one can focus on an arbitrary relationship to extract information
carried by it. As our examples concerning the Euler diagram d in Figure 3
have suggested, an Euler diagram accepts partial reading that focuses on its
local relationships. Unlike the case of set-theoretic sentences, meaning-carrying
relationships do not have to be determined by the whole Euler diagram. Partial
structures in a diagram can be taken to carry meaning.
Although the contrast we have just drawn between set-theoretic sentences
and Euler diagrams is applicable to many sentential representations and dia-
grammatic representations, it does not define a strict dichotomy between two
classes of representations. A language consisting of sentences which have very
particular structures, such as conjunctive normal forms in first-order logics,
does allow one to focus on a particular conjunct in a sentence and extract
meaning out of it. In fact, allowing partial reading seems to be a function
of such a stylized language. However, partial reading in this case is possible
only at the price of severely restricting the syntax of the language. In a more
common language where wide-scope negation and disjunction are permitted,
for example, we do not read o↵ any assertion from a partial structure of a
sentence. Rather, we read a sentence as a whole, to parse its entire construc-
tion and correctly recognize the net assertion made by it. The flip side of this
situation is that, if one introduces negation or disjunction in a system of Euler
diagrams, the system no longer accepts an unconditional partial reading. We
may see that the curve labelled P is included in the curve labelled Q in a
negated Euler diagram, but the diagram does not thereby assert that P is a
subset of Q. Such a diagrammatic system loses the capacity to allow partial
reading, and thus becomes, in this respect, more similar to many sentential
representation systems. Generally, what counts as a meaning-carrying relation
in a representation depends on the entire design of the notational system in
question — that is, for which capabilities it has been developed and because
of which capabilities it has been used (see [19] for an account of how a specific
semantic convention of a notational system arises).
Meaning-carrying relationships are central to our notion of observation.
In particular, observation from a single statement,  , is a binary relationship
4 From this point forward, we will not adopt the standard convention of omitting brackets
where no semantic ambiguity arises, in order to avoid potential confusion as to the structures
in set-theoretic sentences that are meaning carriers.
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between   and another statement,  o, denoted     o, which ensures the
following properties hold:
1. some of the meaning-carrying relationships holding in   hold in  o, and
2.  o supports just enough relationships to express the meanings carried by
the selected relationships in   and nothing stronger.
These two properties imply that   must semantically entail  o but, as we have
seen above, observation is not equivalent to semantic entailment. In practice,
any observation relation must be formally defined by appealing to the syntax of
the notations in question, and consider how the meaning-carrying relationships
arise from the manner in which the semantics are defined.
In terms of a set of statements, ⌃, the only meaning-carrying relationships
in ⌃ arise within each individual statement in ⌃. This implies that the only
statements observable from ⌃ must be observable from one of the elements in
⌃. Therefore, we have the following definition, which assumes an observation
relation is defined between pairs of statements.
Definition 1 Let ⌃ be a finite set of statements and  o be a single statement.
Then  o is observable from ⌃, denoted ⌃   o, i↵  o is observable from
some statement,  , in ⌃. The set of statements that are observable from ⌃ is
denoted O(⌃).
To conclude this section, we introduce the concept of a set of statements,
⌃, being observationally complete with respect to some set of statements, ⌃✏.
We can think of ⌃✏ as being the set of conclusions we wish to draw from ⌃,
some or all of which may be observable.
Definition 2 Let ⌃ and ⌃✏ be finite sets of statements. Then ⌃ is obser-
vationally complete with respect to ⌃✏ if
⌃✏ ✓ O(⌃).
Definition 3 Let ⌃ and ⌃✏ be finite sets of statements. Then ⌃ is obser-
vationally devoid with respect to ⌃✏ if
⌃✏ \O(⌃) = ;.
To illustrate the ideas of observational completeness and devoidness, we ap-
peal to D = {d}, where d is in Figure 3. Taking D = ⌃ and ⌃✏ = {d1, d2, d3},
we see that D is observationally complete. However, taking instead ⌃✏ = {d4},
D is observationally devoid.
Observationally complete representations of information can be considered
powerful in the following sense: if ⌃✏ contains all the statements whose truth
we wish to establish then we can simply observe them all to be true from ⌃.
Likewise, observationally devoid representations of information are weak, since
we cannot observe any statement in ⌃✏ to be true, but must infer them all to
be true.
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4 Observational Advantages
In this section, we define the new concept of an observational advantage, which
generalizes the idea of a free ride introduced previously by Shimojima [17,18].
Our definition of an observational advantage requires three key notions to be
defined: semantic entailment, semantic equivalence, and what it means for a
statement to be observable from a set of statements. These three key notions
must be defined for particular notations (we cannot give notation-independent
definitions) and we assume their existence in order to define observational
advantages; we give formal definitions for these three notions in the context
of set theory and Euler diagrams later in the paper.
The original idea of a free ride assumes a semantics-preserving translation
from one notation, N1, into another notation, N2, such that the translation
ensures the original statements are observable from the resulting statements.
We can explain free rides in detail by appealing to our chosen case study:
set theory and Euler diagrams. Suppose we have a finite set of set-theoretic
sentences, S, where a set-theoretic sentence is a statement that asserts either
set equality or a subset relationship. Further, suppose that we then identify
a semantically equivalent5, finite set of Euler diagrams, D, such that each
statement, s, in S is observable from a diagram, d, in D; we can view D as
being a translation of S. Then the set-theoretic sentences that are observable
from the diagrams in D but not from S are free rides from D given S.
More formally, suppose ⌃ and ⌃ˆ are finite, semantically equivalent sets of
statements and let   be a statement. For   to be a free ride from ⌃ˆ given ⌃
the following must hold:
1. the set ⌃ contains only statements observable from ⌃ˆ,
2.   is not observable from ⌃, and
3.   is observable from ⌃ˆ.
T
Fig. 4 Free rides.
For example, take
⌃ = S = {(P \Q) = ;, (R \Q) = ;, T ✓ Q},
which contains three set-theoretic sentences, and ⌃ˆ = D = {d}, where d is in
Figure 4. The free rides from D given S are the set-theoretic sentences that
5 We use the term semantically equivalent in the standard, model theoretic way: two (sets
of) statements are semantically equivalent if they have the same models.
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one can observe to be true from D but which need to be inferred, and cannot
simply be observed, from S. For instance, we can observe both (P \T ) = ; and
(R \ T ) = ; from d but both of these set-theoretic sentences must be inferred
from S; in the former case, (P \ T ) = ; can be inferred from (P \ Q) = ;
and T ✓ Q. By contrast, whilst the set-theoretic sentence (P \Q) = ; can be
observed from D it can also be observed from S, so it is not a free ride from
D. Free rides are examples of what we call observational advantages of the
Euler diagram over the original set theory representation of information. An
important di↵erence between observational advantages and free rides is that
observational advantages do not require the set ⌃ to contain only statements
observable from ⌃ˆ.
Definition 4 Let ⌃ and ⌃ˆ be finite, semantically equivalent sets of state-
ments. Let   be a statement. If
1.   is not observable from ⌃, and
2.   is observable from ⌃ˆ
then   is an observational advantage of ⌃ˆ given ⌃. The set of all observa-
tional advantages of ⌃ˆ given ⌃ is denoted OA(⌃ˆ,⌃).
The abstract nature of Definition 4 means that it readily applies to any (not
necessarily distinct) notations over which statements are formed, provided the
aforementioned three key notions are defined. Furthermore, an observational
advantage   can be expressed in either the representation of ⌃ or ⌃ˆ.
Lemma 1 Let ⌃ and ⌃ˆ be finite, semantically equivalent sets of statements.
Let   be an observational advantage of ⌃ˆ given ⌃. Then ⌃ semantically entails
 .
Taking ⌃ = S = {(P \Q) = ;, (R \Q) = ;, S ✓ Q}, and ⌃ˆ = D = {d} as
above, the set-theoretic sentence   ⌘ (P\S) = ; is an observational advantage
of D and is semantically entailed by both D and S.
The motivation for generalizing the concept of a free ride to observational
advantages arises from the rich way in which statements can be made. In
practice, when representing information, people are allowed to choose any
appropriate set of statements. This means there is no guarantee that user-
defined semantically equivalent sets of statements ensure that observability is
preserved.6 Through our more general approach, we are able to give insight
into the relative observational benefits of one representation, ⌃ˆ, of information
over another, ⌃, regardless of whether the statements in one of these sets are
all observable from the other.
6 Such situations can arise in application areas like ontology engineering, where teams
of people devise statements in order to define a domain of interest. Team members may
have their own preferred notation, such as description logic [1], whereas others may prefer
visual approaches, such as VOWL [13] or concept diagrams [24]. But if we can determine
what is observable for each representation, and consequently what the potential observa-
tional advantages of each representation are, then we can better choose our appropriate
representation.
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To illustrate this point, consider the set
S = {P = Q, (P \R) = ;}.
In this example, S will play the role of ⌃ˆ in Definition 4. One possible seman-
tically equivalent representation of this information is given by D = {d1, d2}
shown in Figure 5; D and d, also in Figure 5, are playing the roles of ⌃ and
Fig. 5 Observational advantages.
  respectively, but D is not a direct translation of S. Suppose we wish to
know whether P and R represent disjoint sets, expressed by d. The diagram
d needs to be inferred from D, since its informational content is not explicitly
represented by, and thus not observable from, either d1 or d2. By contrast,
the informational content of d is explicitly represented in, and thus observable
from, S via (P \R) = ;. We therefore have:
1. d is not observable from D, and
2. d is observable from S.
Given that we want to know whether P and R represent disjoint sets, S has an
observational advantage over D. Now, similarly to d, the set-theoretic sentence
(P \ R) = ; in S is not observable from either d1 or d2. That is, the set S
does not contain only statements observable from D. Thus, according to the
definition of free rides, d is not a free ride from S given D. This implies that
the original notion of free rides does not allow us to identify this observational
advantage of S over D. By contrast, d is an observational advantage from S
given D, since S and D are semantically equivalent.
Our attention now turns to properties of observational advantages. Suppose
we have a finite set, ⌃, of statements and a set of statements, ⌃✏, such that
⌃ semantically entails every statement in ⌃✏; here, ⌃✏ represents the set of
conclusions we wish to draw from ⌃. It may be that none of the statements
in ⌃✏ are observable from ⌃. However, an alternative representation of the
information in ⌃, say by ⌃ˆ, may ensure that all of the statements in ⌃✏ are
observable. If so, every statement in ⌃✏ is an observational advantage of ⌃ˆ.
In this sense, ⌃✏ has maximal observational advantage.
Definition 5 Let ⌃ and ⌃ˆ be finite, semantically equivalent sets of state-
ments. Let ⌃✏ be a set of statements such that ⌃ semantically entails every
statement in ⌃✏. If
1. ⌃ is observationally devoid with respect to ⌃✏, and
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2. ⌃ˆ is observationally complete with respect to ⌃✏
then ⌃ˆ has maximal observational advantage over ⌃ given ⌃✏.
As a trivial example, taking ⌃ = D1 = {d1} and ⌃ˆ = D2 = {d2}, where d1
and d2 are in Figure 67, D2 has maximal observational advantage over D1,
where ⌃✏ = D1✏ = {d3, d4}.
Fig. 6 Maximal observational advantages.
Whenever ⌃ˆ has maximal observational advantage, it is a particularly ef-
ficacious representation of the information in ⌃ when we want to deduce all
of the statements in ⌃✏. This is because ⌃ˆ makes all of the statements in ⌃✏
observably true, whereas they must all be inferred from ⌃ (in the sense of
using inference rules to make deductions). In the special case where ⌃✏ com-
prises all of the statements that are semantically entailed by, but not in, ⌃,
we can think of ⌃ˆ as being, from the perspective of observability, an optimal
representation of the information in ⌃.
5 Two Formal Systems: Set Theory and Euler Diagrams
To develop the theory of observation and observational advantages in the case
of set theory and Euler diagrams, we require a formalization of both systems.
This section presents typical formalizations. The set theory formalization is
commonly known whereas a formalizations for Euler diagrams builds on [25].
Both notations incorporate formal syntax and semantics, adopting a model-
theoretic approach. To enable ready comparison of statements made across
notations, the set of labels used to denote sets will be common to both set
theory and diagrams. Moreover, the interpretation of these labels as sets will
also be common. Section 5.1 defines these common entities, with the later
subsections defining the statements that can be made, and their semantics, by
7 Note that d1 and d2 are semantically equivalent because they are both true under the
same circumstances. Formally, these diagrams have the same models, a concept made precise
in the next section.
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set theory in Section 5.2 and by Euler diagrams in Section 5.3. The last Sec-
tion 5.4 defines semantic equivalence and entailment across the two notations,
crucial for our theory of observational advantages.
5.1 Common Concepts
Both set-theoretic notation and Euler diagrams can be used to make assertions
about sets, such as P ✓ Q and (P [Q) ✓ R, visually illustrated by the Euler
diagrams d1 and d2 respectively in Figure 7. In order to give an account of
Fig. 7 Visualizing sets using Euler diagrams.
the observational advantages delivered by Euler diagrams over set-theoretic
notation, we must provide a common definition of the interpretation of the
labels, such as P , Q and R, used to represent sets. First, these labels are
chosen from a given set.
Definition 6 Define L to be a set whose elements are called labels. Two
special symbols, ; and U , are not in L.
Formally, labels represent sets and are, thus, interpreted as subsets of some
universal set, 4; we use P4 to denote the powerset of 4.
Definition 7 An interpretation is a pair, I = (4, ), where 4 is a set and
 is a function,  : L [ {;, U} ! P4, that maps labels to subsets of 4 and
ensures that  (;) = ; and  (U) = 4.
For example, taking L = {P,Q,R}, and 4 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, we can define
 (P ) = {1, 2},  (Q) = {1, 2, 4} and  (R) = {1, 5}. Then the assertion P ✓
Q and the diagram d1 in Figure 7 both express true statements given this
interpretation, since  (P ) ✓  (Q). By contrast, (P [ Q) ✓ R and d2 do
not express true statements given this interpretation since  (P ) [  (Q) =
{1, 2, 4} * {1, 5} =  (R). As we proceed through the next two subsections,
we will identify the conditions under which an interpretation ‘agrees with’ the
intended meaning of assertions made about sets using set-theoretic sentences
and Euler diagrams.
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5.2 Set Theory
Set-theoretic expressions are commonly formed using four operators, \, [, \,
and a (i.e., intersection, union, di↵erence and complement), as follows.
Definition 8 The following are set-theoretic expressions or, simply, set-
expressions:
1. U and ; are both set-expressions,
2. every label in L is a set-expression, and
3. if s1 and s2 are set-expressions then so are (s1 \ s2), (s1 [ s2), (s1\s2), and
s1.
We will often blur the distinction between set-expressions and the sets they
represent. For instance, strictly speaking (P \ Q) represents the set  (P ) \
 (Q), given an interpretation (4, ), but when speaking informally we will
simply say ‘the set (P \Q)’ for simplicity.
Given sets, such as (P [Q) and (P \R), we are able to assert relationships
between sets, such as (P [ Q) ✓ (P \ R), P = (Q\R), (P [ Q) = U , and
(P\Q) = ;. In our case study, we consider the following standard relationships
between sets.
Definition 9 Given set-expressions s1 and s2 the following are set-theoretic
sentences:
1. s1 ✓ s2, and
2. s1 = s2.
The set of all set-theoretic sentences is denoted SALL.
When we want to give set-expressions names we will use ⌘ to avoid overloading
= in an ambiguous and potentially confusing way. For example, given the set-
expression s1 and the set-theoretic sentence s1 = s2, in order to name them s
and t respectively, we will write s ⌘ s1 and t ⌘ s1 = s2 instead of s = s1 and
t = s1 = s2.
It will be useful, for our work on observation in Section 6, to have access
to the labels used in set-expressions.
Definition 10 Let s be a set-expression. The set of labels in s, denoted
L(s), is defined recursively:
1. if s ⌘ U or s ⌘ ; then L(s) = ;.
2. if s 2 L then L(s) = {s},
3. if s ⌘ (s1 ? s2), where ? 2 {\,[, \}, then L(s) = L(s1) [ L(s2), and
4. if s ⌘ s1 then L(s) = L(s1).
Our attention now turns to formal semantics. We have already defined the
notion of an interpretation, which maps labels to sets. Our next step is to
extend the mapping,  , so that it interprets more complex set-expressions as
sets.
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Definition 11 Let s be a set-expression. Let I = (4, ) be an interpretation.
An extension of  to map set-expressions to sets is defined as follows: for each
set-expression, s,
1. if s 2 L [ {U, ;} then  (s) is already defined,
2. if s ⌘ (s1 ? s2), where ? 2 {\,[, \}, then  (s) =  (s1) ?  (s2), and
3. if s ⌘ s1 then  (s) =  (s1) =  (U)\ (s1).
Whenever we have an interpretation, we assume that the extension to set-
expressions as just defined is given. We are now in a position to define when
an interpretation is a model for a set-theoretic sentence.
Definition 12 Let s be a set-theoretic sentence. Let I = (4, ) be an in-
terpretation. Then I satisfies s and is a model for s under the following
circumstances:
1. if s ⌘ s1 ✓ s2 then  (s1) ✓  (s2), and
2. if s ⌘ s1 = s2 then  (s1) =  (s2).
Let S be a finite set of set-theoretic sentences. Then I satisfies S and is a
model for S provided I is a model for each set-theoretic sentence in S.
For example, suppose L = {P,Q,R}, and we have I = (4, ) where 4 =
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5},  (P ) = {1, 2},  (Q) = {1, 2, 4} and  (R) = {1, 5}. Then P ✓ Q
is modelled by I whereas (P [ Q) ✓ R is not. Therefore, taking S = {P ✓
Q, (P [Q) ✓ R}, we can see that I does not model S.
Lastly, we recap what is meant by a meaning-carrying relationship for set-
theoretic sentences. We have already observed that any set-theoretic sentence,
s, has only a single meaning-carrying relationship:
– if s ⌘ s1 ✓ s2 then the meaning-carrying relationship of s is that s1 is
written to the left-hand side of ✓ and s2 is written to the right-hand side,
and
– if s ⌘ s1 = s2 then the meaning-carrying relationship of s is that s1 is
written to the left-hand side of = and s2 is written to the right-hand side.
Obviously, these relationships determine the truth-values of set-theoretic
sentences in an interpretation, and so they conform to this requirement of
meaning carriers given earlier in the paper.
5.3 Euler Diagrams
Euler diagrams are formed from closed curves, each of which has a label drawn
from L. We adopt the standard approach of formalizing Euler diagrams via an
abstract syntax. This abstract syntax identifies curves with their labels and
captures the spatial relationships between the curves via zones. In particular,
the zones correspond to regions formed from the curves.
To illustrate, the Euler diagram in Figure 8 contains three curves with
labels P , Q and R. These curves give rise to six zones. One such zone is outside
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Fig. 8 The syntax of Euler diagrams.
all three curves. Another is inside just the curve labelled Q but outside the
remaining two curves. In general, each of the diagram’s zones is a region that
can be described as being inside some (or none) of the diagram’s curves and
outside the remaining curves. This insight is used in our formal definition of
a zone:
Definition 13 A zone is a pair of finite, disjoint sets of labels, (in, out),
drawn from L. The set of all zones is denoted Z. A finite set of zones is a
region. The set of all regions is denoted R.
In terms of drawn Euler diagrams, the labels in the set in arise from the
curves that the zone is inside whereas the labels in the set out arise from the
curves that the zone is outside. So, formally, the zone outside all of the curves in
Figure 8 is (;, {P,Q,R}) and the zone inside just Q is ({Q}, {P,R}). The other
four zones are: ({P,Q}, {R}), ({P,Q,R}, ;), ({Q,R}, {P}) and ({R}, {P,Q}).
Our definition of an Euler diagram records the labels used and the zones that
are present.
Definition 14 An Euler diagram, d, is a pair, (L,Z), where
1. L is a finite subset of L, and
2. Z is a set of zones such that each (in, out), in Z ensures in [ out = L.
Given d = (L,Z), we sometimes write L(d) and Z(d) for L and Z respectively.
The set of all Euler diagrams is denoted DALL.
Given an Euler diagram, it is helpful to define the regions of the diagram
and the missing zones of the diagram. Intuitively, the regions are formed from
the diagram’s zones. Informally, the missing zones (which we define shortly)
are zones which could be present given the labels used in the diagram but are
not there. Missing zones allow us to define the diagram’s semantics.
Definition 15 Let d = (L,Z) be an Euler diagram. The regions of d are
elements of R(d) = PZ.
Definition 16 Let d = (L,Z) be an Euler diagram. The missing zones of
d are elements of MZ (d) = {(in, L\in) : in ✓ L}\Z.
For example, consider again d in Figure 5 on page 13. For d, the sets of la-
bels and zones are L = {P,R} and Z = {({P}, {R}), ({R}, {P}), (;, {P,R})}.
Now, the set of all possible zones that can be generated from the labels (i.e.,
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{(in, L\in) : in ✓ L}) is {({P}, {R}), ({R}, {P}), (;, {P,R}), ({P,R}, ;)}. No-
tice how the intersection of P and R (i.e., the zone ({P,R}, ;)) is not present in
the diagram d in Figure 5 – it is a missing zone. Thus,MZ(d) = {({P,R}, ;)}.
We are now in a position to define the semantics of Euler diagrams. Similar
to our treatment of set theory, we must first extend interpretations so that they
assign sets to zones and regions.
Definition 17 Let I = (4, ) be an interpretation. An extension of  to
map zones and regions to sets is defined as follows:
1. for each zone, (in, out),
 (in, out) =
\
l2in
 (l) \
\
l2out
 (l),
and
2. for each region, r,
 (r) =
[
(in,out)2r
 (in, out).
Wherever we talk of interpretations, we assume that the extension to zones
and regions is given, as well as the extension to set-expressions. Again, just as
for our treatment of set theory, we also have the notion of a model for Euler
diagrams:
Definition 18 Let d = (L,Z) be an Euler diagram. Let I = (4, ) be an
interpretation. Then I satisfies d and is amodel for d whenever  (MZ (d)) =
;. Let D be a finite set of Euler diagrams. Then I satisfies D and is a model
for D provided I is a model for each Euler diagram in D.
For example, suppose L = {P,Q,R}, and we have I = (4, ) where 4 =
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5},  (P ) = {1, 2},  (Q) = {1, 2, 4} and  (R) = {1, 5}. Then d1 in
Figure 7 is modelled by I whereas d2 is not. Therefore, taking D = {d1, d2},
we can see that I does not model D.
As with set theory, we now recap the notion of a meaning-carrying relation-
ship for Euler diagrams. We observe that the curves give rise to the meaning
of diagrams. When two curves, P and Q, have disjoint interiors, they represent
disjoint sets. At the abstract syntax level, this is formally identified by there
being no zones inside both curves. That is, the region, r, ‘inside’ both curves
is missing from the diagram, identified by the following property:
r = {(in, out) 2 Z(d) : P,Q 2 in} = ;.
Continuing in this vein, if one curve, R, is contained by another, S, at the
abstract syntax level this is captured by the region rR inside R being contained
by the region rS inside S:
rR = {(in, out) 2 Z(d) : R 2 in} ✓ {(in, out) 2 Z(d) : S 2 in} = rS
In general, the diagram’s regions give rise to meaning-carrying relationships.
Given an Euler diagram, d = (L,Z), where regions r1 and r2 are in d, the
following are meaning-carrying relationships of d:
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– if r1 ✓ r2 then r1 ✓ r2 is a meaning-carrying relationship, and
– if r1 = r2 then r1 = r2 is a meaning-carrying relationship.
Notice that other relationships between regions, such as r1\r2 6= ; in d are
not meaning carriers. In the given instance, whilst  (r1)\ (r2) 6= ; evaluates
to either true or false in any interpretation, in some models for d the assertion
 (r1)\ (r2) 6= ; will be true and in others it will be false. A clear requirement
on meaning carriers is that they must have a fixed interpretation in models
for d. That is, they cannot be true in some models and false in others.
5.4 Semantic Equivalence and Entailment
Our last key task in this section is to formally define semantic relationships
between statements, regardless of whether they are set-theoretic sentences
or Euler diagrams. To illustrate, taking S = {P ✓ Q, (P [ Q) ✓ R} and
D = {d1, d2}, where d1 and d2 are in Figure 7 on page 15, the set-theoretic
sentences and the Euler diagrams have the same models. This means that they
are semantically equivalent. To formally define semantic equivalence, and the
related notion of semantic entailment, we first define the generic notion of a
statement.
Definition 19 A statement is defined as follows:
1. any set-theoretic sentence is a statement, and
2. any Euler diagram is a statement.
We will typically denote Euler diagrams by di, set-theoretic sentences by
si and statements in general by  i. Similarly, we will denote a set of Euler
diagrams by D, a set of set-theoretic sentences by S and a set of statements
by ⌃. Now, the notion of a model for a set of statements naturally generalizes
the definitions of a model already given: an interpretation is a model for ⌃
if it is a model for every statement in ⌃. At this point, we are able to define
semantic equivalence.
Definition 20 Let  1 and  2 be statements. If  1 and  2 have the same
models then they are semantically equivalent. Let ⌃1 and ⌃2 be finite sets
of statements. If ⌃1 and ⌃2 have the same models then they are semantically
equivalent.
Definition 21 Let ⌃ be a finite set of statements and let   be a statement.
Then ⌃ semantically entails  , denoted ⌃ ✏  , provided every model for
⌃ is also a model for  . If   is semantically entailed by, but not in ⌃, then  
is non-trivially semantically entailed by ⌃.
For example, given S = {(P\Q) = ;, R ✓ P,R ✓ T} and s1 ⌘ (R\Q) = ;,
we have S semantically entails (P \Q) = ;, R ✓ P,R ✓ T and s1. In the case
of s1, which is also non-trivially semantically entailed, this is because whenever
the set-theoretic sentences in S are true, it must also be the case that s1 is
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true. By contrast, S does not semantically entail s2 ⌘ P = Q. That is, we
can pick the interpretation I = ({1, 2}, ) where  (P ) = {1},  (Q) = {2},
 (R) = {1}, and  (T ) = {1, 2} is a model for S but not for s2 (notably,
 (P ) 6=  (Q)).
Considering Figure 9, given D = {d0, d00} and d1, D semantically entails d0,
d00 and d1. In the case of d1, which is also non-trivially semantically entailed,
this is because whenever the Euler diagrams in D are true, it must also be the
case that d1 is true. By contrast, D does not semantically entail d2. That is,
we can pick the interpretation I = ({1, 2}, ) where  (P ) = {1},  (Q) = {2},
 (R) = {1}, and  (T ) = {1, 2} is a model for D but not for d2 (notably,
the missing zone ({P}, {Q}) does not represent the empty set:  ({P}, {Q}) =
{1}).
T
Fig. 9 Semantic entailment.
The next definition provides us with notation and terminology with which
to talk about the set of statements that are semantically entailed by S.
Definition 22 Let S be a finite set of set-theoretic sentences. Define S✏ to be
the set of set-theoretic sentences that are non-trivially semantically entailed
by S. Let L be a set of labels. We define SL✏ to be the largest subset of S✏
such that every set-theoretic sentence, s, in SL✏ ensures L(s) ✓ L.
For example, taking S = {(P [ Q) ✓ R, (P \ Q) = ;}, the set-theoretic
sentences P ✓ R and Q ✓ R are both in S{P,Q,R}✏ (along with many others),
whereas ((P \ T )\Q) = ; uses the label T and, so, is not in S{P,Q,R}✏ despite
being in S✏.
One can readily define similar notions for Euler diagrams.
Definition 23 Let D be a finite set of Euler diagrams. Define D✏ to be the
set of Euler diagrams that are non-trivially semantically entailed by D. Let L
be a set of labels. We define DL✏ to be the largest subset of D✏ such that every
Euler diagram, d, in DL✏ ensures L(d) ✓ L.
In Figure 10, taking D = {d}, the set D✏ contains all diagrams with no missing
zones (i.e., Venn diagrams), other than d. The set DL(d)✏ contains all Euler
diagrams in D✏ whose labels are chosen from {P,Q,R}.
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Fig. 10 Semantic entailment of sets of diagrams.
6 Observation Relations
We now have a method of comparing semantics across these two notations, so
we are in a position to define what it means for a statement made in one of them
to be observable from a statement made in the other. For our purposes, we also
need to identify when one set-theoretic sentence is observable from another.
We need these three observation relations because they allow us to establish
that for any set of set-theoretic sentences, say S, there exists a diagram, d,
such that for any set-theoretic sentence, s, that is non-trivially semantically
entailed by S:
1. s is not observable from S, for which we need an observation relation on
set-theoretic sentences, and
2. s is observable from {d}, for which we need an observation relation between
diagrams and set-theoretic sentences.
In addition, to identify such a diagram, d, we first define an observation relation
between set-theoretic sentences and diagrams. This permits us to translate
each set-theoretic sentence, s0, in S into an observable diagram, d0. After this
process, all of the diagrams resulting from this translation can be unified to
produce the required d.
6.1 Observing set-theoretic sentences from set-theoretic sentences
Any meaning-carrying relationship in a set-theoretic sentence is determined by
the whole statement, thus each set-theoretic sentence has a unique meaning-
carrying relationship. Moreover, the only set-theoretic sentence observable
from a set-theoretic sentence is the set-theoretic sentence itself.
Definition 24 Let s1 and s2 be set-theoretic sentences. Then s2 is observ-
able from s1, denoted s1  s2, i↵ s1 and s2 are the same set-theoretic sentence.
Trivially, we have the following lemma which is stated because it is a re-
quirement that the observation relation respects semantic entailment:
Lemma 2 Let s1 and s2 be set-theoretic sentences. If s1  s2 then s1 seman-
tically entails s2.
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6.2 Observing Euler diagrams from set-theoretic sentences
We now define what it means for a diagram d to be observable from a set-
theoretic sentence, s. Since each set-theoretic sentence has a unique meaning-
carrying relationship, there is a unique observable diagram d from s. To ex-
emplify this point, consider the set-theoretic sentence s ⌘ (P [ Q) ✓ R. The
unique meaning-carrying relationship in s can be described in the following
way: the pair of labels P and Q connected by the symbol [ are connected to
label R with the symbol ✓ and no other visuo-spatial relationship holds among
these and other labels in L. Call this relationship  . The meaning carried by  
is that P union Q is a subset of R. Now, the visuo-spatial relationship carrying
this meaning in Euler diagrams is that the union of the curves labelled P and
Q is included in the curve labelled R. Call this relationship  . Since   is the
only meaning carrier in s, the only diagram observable from s is the diagram
that supports   and supports only those spatial relationships that are neces-
sary to express the meaning carried by   and nothing stronger. For example,
consider Figure 11: the diagram d1 is just that and is observable from s8. By
contrast, neither d2 nor d3 are observable from s. Lacking a curve labelled Q,
the diagram d2 fails to support  . The diagram d3, whilst semantically equiva-
lent to s, is not observable from s, since it supports unnecessary relationships
involving the curve labelled S.
Fig. 11 Observing diagrams from set-theoretic sentences.
To formally define the diagram observable from a set-theoretic sentence, s,
we need access to the labels used in s; these are the labels that must be present
in the observable diagram. Once we have access to them, we can convert set-
expressions to regions from which a diagram will be built. We will exemplify
the approach using s ⌘ (P [ Q) ✓ R as a running example, formed from
the set-expressions s1 ⌘ (P [ Q) and s2 ⌘ R. Given L(s1) = {P,Q} and
L(s2) = {R}, we need to create regions that comprise zones that are formed
over {P,Q,R}; these are the labels to be present in the required diagram and
no others. The core idea is to translate each set-expression, si, given a set of
8 One may wonder if the partial overlap of the curves labelled P and Q in d1 is really
‘necessary’, since even if these curves stood in a di↵erent relationship (e.g., separated), the
diagram could support   and express the information that P union Q is a subset of R.
However, any of such alternative relationships would make the diagram express something
stronger than this information (e.g., that P and Q are disjoint). Having the partial overlap
of the curves labelled P and Q is necessary in this sense—it is the only way to translate s
to an Euler diagram without expressing anything stronger.
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labels, L, to a region, ri, that represents the same set as si. Moreover, the
zones in ri must each form a two-way partition of L. The set L must include
all labels in L(s) (of course, as L contains labels it must also be a subset of L).
In our example, the region r1 for s1 is required to represent a subset of r2, the
region for s2. This is because the diagram must convey the meaning-carrying
relationship s1 ✓ s2.
Definition 25 Let s be a set-expression and let L be a set of labels such that
L(s) ✓ L. The translation of s given L into a region, denoted T (s, L), is
defined recursively:
1. if s ⌘ ; then T (s, L) = ;,
2. if s ⌘ U then T (s, L) = {(in, out) 2 Z : in [ out = L},
3. if s 2 L then T (s, L) = {(in, out) 2 T (U,L) : s 2 in},
4. if s ⌘ (s1 ? s2), where ? 2 {\,[, \}, then T (s, L) = (T (s1, L) ? T (s2, L)),
and
5. if s ⌘ s1 then T (s, L) = (T (U,L)\T (s1, L)).
In our running example, taking L = L(s1) [ L(s2) = {P,Q,R}, we get:
1. the translation of s1 ⌘ P [Q is given by
T (s1, L) = T (P [Q,L)
= T (P,L) [ T (Q,L)
= {(in, out) 2 T (U,L) : P 2 in} [ {(in, out) 2 T (U,L) : Q 2 in}
= {({P}, {Q,R}), ({P,Q}, {R}), ({P,R}, {Q}), ({P,Q,R}, ;)} [
{({Q}, {P,R}), ({P,Q}, {R}), ({Q,R}, {P}), ({P,Q,R}, ;)}
= {({P}, {Q,R}), ({P,Q}, {R}), ({P,R}, {Q}), ({P,Q,R}, ;),
({Q}, {P,R}), ({Q,R}, {P})},
2. the translation of s2 ⌘ R is given by
T (s2, L) = T (R,L)
= {(in, out) 2 T (U,L) : R 2 in}
= {({R}, {P,Q}), ({P,R}, {Q}), ({Q,R}, {P}), ({P,Q,R}, ;)}.
An important property of our translation is that it preserves semantics. To
illustrate, consider R and T (R,L) just given and an arbitrary interpretation
I = (4, ):
 (R) = ( (R) \  (P )) [ ( (R) \  (P ))
= ( (R) \  (P ) \  (Q)) [ ( (R) \  (P ) \  (Q)) [
( (R) \  (P ) \  (Q)) [ ( (R) \  (P ) \  (Q))
=  ({R}, {P,Q}) [  ({Q,R}, {P}) [  ({P,R}, {Q}) [
 ({P,Q,R}, ;)
=  (T (R,L)).
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Lemma 3 Let s be a set-expression and let L be a set of labels such that
L(s) ✓ L. Let I = (4, ) be an interpretation. Then  (s) =  (T (s, L)).
To construct a diagram, d1, for s1 ✓ s2, we need to ensure that in any
model, (4, ), for d1,  (T (s1, L(s1) [ L(s2))) ✓  (T (s2, L(s1) [ L(s2))). To
achieve this, the missing zones of d1 are those in T (s1, L(s1)[L(s2)) that are
not in T (s2, L(s1)[L(s2)). By making these zones missing from d1, we ensure
that they each represent the empty set in any model for d1, thus ensuring that
 (T (s1, L(s1)[L(s2))) ✓  (T (s2, L(s1)[L(s2))). This means that d1 will be
semantically equivalent to s1 ✓ s2. Thus, our diagram d1 has a missing zone
set:
MZ (d1) = {({P}, {Q,R}), ({P,Q}, {R}), {Q}, {P,R})}.
This is the missing zone set for d1 in Figure 11 on page 23, which we have
already seen is observable from (P [ Q) ✓ R. For set-theoretic sentences of
the form s1 = s2, the missing zones are those in the symmetric di↵erence
of T (s1, L(s1) [ L(s2)) and T (s2, L(s1) [ L(s2)), because these zones must
represent empty sets in order for
 (T (s1, L(s1) [ L(s2))) =  (T (s2, L(s1) [ L(s2)))
to hold and, therefore,  (s1) =  (s2), to be true.
Finally, we are able to define when a diagram d is observable from a set
relation s.
Definition 26 Let s be a set-theoretic sentence and let d be an Euler diagram.
Then d is observable from s, denoted s d, i↵
1. if s is of the form s1 ✓ s2 then
(a) L(d) = L(s1) [ L(s2), and
(b) MZ (d) = T (s1, L(d))\T (s2, L(d)) and
2. if s is of the form s1 = s2 then
(a) L(d) = L(s1) [ L(s2), and
(b) MZ (d) =
 T (s1, L(d))\T (s2, L(d))  [ (T (s2, L(d))\T (s1, L(d)) .
Again, we state the following lemma since the observation relation must respect
semantic entailment.
Lemma 4 Let s be a set-theoretic sentence and let d be an Euler diagram. If
s d then s semantically entails d.
In fact, if s d then s and d are semantically equivalent.
6.3 Observing set-theoretic sentences from Euler diagrams
Our attention now turns to defining when a set-theoretic sentence, s, is observ-
able from an Euler diagram, d. For s to be observable, the unique meaning-
carrying relationship of s must arise from a meaning-carrying relationship in
d. Now, the curves in Euler diagrams give rise to regions. The relationships
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between these regions are meaning-carrying and they visually indicate the re-
lationships between the sets they represent. For example, in Figure 12, r1 ✓ r2
where
r1 = {({P,Q}, {R}), ({P,Q,R}, ;)}
and
r2 = {({P,Q}, {R}), ({P,Q,R}, ;), ({Q}, {P,R}), ({Q,R}, {P})}.
Semantically, in any model, I = (4, ), for this diagram we have  (r1) ✓
 (r2). To identify the set-theoretic sentences observable from a diagram, we
need to consider how we describe the regions in diagrams and to what those
descriptions correspond in terms of set-expressions.
Fig. 12 Representing regions.
Given a region in an Euler diagram, there are many di↵erent ways of de-
scribing it. For example, in Figure 12, the region r1 just given above can be
described in at least the following ways:
1. r1 is the region inside P ,
2. r1 is the region inside both P and Q,
3. r1 is the region inside P but outside R combined with the region inside
both P and R, and
4. r1 is the region that does not include anything outside of P .
These ways of describing regions can be formally captured by describing sets
of zones in the region via the curves those zones lie inside and the curves they
lie outside. For instance, saying that r1 is the region inside P can be more
precisely stated as ‘r1 is the region completely inside P and not completely
outside any of the curves’. A set of zones with a description such as this is
called a zonal region, since the description is akin to how we describe zones [9].
Regions can then be described through di↵erent ways of combining zonal re-
gions. For instance, in our example, r1 can also be described using two zonal
regions: the region completely inside P and completely outside R union the
region completely inside both P and R and not completely outside any of the
curves.
It is possible to completely describe any region using combinations of zonal
regions and there are many di↵erent ways of doing so. To make this notion of
describing regions precise, we first define zonal regions.
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Definition 27 Let d = (L,Z) be an Euler diagram. Let IN and OUT be
finite disjoint sets of labels such that IN [OUT ✓ L. The zonal region over
L in d, denoted hIN ,OUT i, is defined to be
hIN ,OUT i = {(in, out) 2 Z : IN ✓ in ^OUT ✓ out}.
For example, given d = (L,Z), where L = {P,Q,R, S} and
Z = {(in, out) 2 Z : in [ out = L},
taking IN = {P,Q} and OUT = {R}, we have
h{P,Q}, {C}i = {({P,Q, S}, {R}), ({P,Q}, {R,S}}.
We now define region descriptions, which are merely syntactic devices used
to characterize di↵erent ways in which regions can be built from zonal regions
in a diagram, d. Note that descriptions of regions are not unique.
Definition 28 Let d = (L,Z) be an Euler diagram and let r be a region of
d. A description of r in d is defined as follows:
1. if r = ; then ; is a description of r in d.
2. if r is a zonal region of the form hIN ,OUT i then the tuple hIN ,OUT i is
a description of r in d,
3. if r = r1 ? r2 for some regions r1 and r2 in d and ? 2 {\,[, \} then a
description of r is (R1 ?R2) where R1 and R2 are descriptions of r1 and r2
in d, respectively, and
4. if r = r1 for some region r1 then a description of r is R1 where R1 is a
description of r1 in d.
Returning to Figure 12, the region, r1, comprising the zones ({P,Q}, {R})
and ({P,Q,R}, ;) can be formally described in at least the following ways:
1. h{P}, ;i,
2. h{P,Q}, ;i
3. h{P}, {R}i [ h{P,R}, ;i, and
4. h;, {P}i.
Trivially, we have the following result:
Lemma 5 Let d be an Euler diagram. Every region of d has a description in
d.
Our next task is to turn region descriptions into set-expressions. Consider
a zone, (in, out). Then, by Definition 17, (in, out) is interpreted as the set
 (in, out) =
\
l2in
 (l) \
\
l2out
 (l),
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in any interpretation, I = (4, ). Thus, (in, out) readily corresponds to a
set-expression of the form (noting the omission of brackets, which are formally
required): \
l2in
l \
\
l2out
l.
We can use this insight to define set-expressions arising from zonal regions.
For instance, the zonal region h{P}, {R}i represents (P \R) and, equivalently,
(R \ P ). Since the diagram prescribes no reading order for the sets, we can
take both (P \R) and (R\P ) as being set-expressions arising from h{P}, {R}i
reflecting the commutativity of \. The set-expressions arising from zonal re-
gions also need to reflect the associativity of \. For instance, the zonal region
h{P,Q}, {R,S}i can be translated into the following set-expressions, amongst
others:
1. (P \ (Q \ (R \ S))),
2. ((P \Q) \ (R \ S)), and
3. ((P \ (Q \R)) \ S).
The rich way of translating zonal regions into set-expressions is captured by
Definition 29, part 2. Before presenting this definition, we illustrate the idea
more precisely by showing the steps required to translate h{P,Q}, {R,S}i into
((P \Q) \ (R \ S)). In particular, we have
h{P,Q}, {R,S}i = h{P,Q}, ;i \ h;, {R,S}i
= ((h{P}, ;i \ h{Q}, ;i) \ (h;, {R}i \ h;, {S}i))
7! ((P \Q) \ (R \ S)).
In the last (translation) step 7!, zonal regions of the form h{l}, ;i and h;, {l}i
are simply replaced by l and l respectively.
Definition 29 Let d be an Euler diagram and let r be a region of d. Let s
be a set-expression. We say that s is a translation of r in d i↵ there exists a
description, R, of r in d where one of the following four conditions holds:
1. R = ; and s ⌘ ;.
2. R = hIN ,OUT i and either
(a) IN [OUT = ; and s ⌘ U ,
(b) IN [OUT = {l} and s ⌘ l, where l 2 IN ,
(c) IN [OUT = {l} and s ⌘ l, where l 2 OUT , or
(d) |IN [ OUT |   2 and there exist two disjoint, non-empty subsets, L1
and L2, of IN [OUT such that
i. L1 [ L2 = IN [OUT ,
ii. there exists a set-expression, s1, that is a translation of
hIN \L1,OUT\L1i,
iii. there exists a set-expression, s2, that is a translation of
hIN \L2,OUT\L2i,
and
iv. s ⌘ (s1 \ s2).
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3. R = (R1 ? R2), for some region descriptions R1 and R2, and there exist
set-expressions s1 and s2 where s1 and s2 that are translations of R1 and
R2 respectively such that s ⌘ (s1 ? s2).
4. R = R1 for some region description R1 and there exists a translation s1 of
R1 such that s ⌘ s1.
Importantly, in any model for d, the set represented by a region is the same
as that represented by any translation of it.
Lemma 6 Let d be an Euler diagram and let r be a region of d. Let s be a
set-expression that is a translation of r in d. Let I = (U, ) be a model for d.
Then  (s) =  (r).
We are now in a position to identify the set-theoretic sentences observable
from diagrams. Recall that the relationship between two regions, r1 and r2,
in an Euler diagram d is meaning-carrying and corresponds to a relationship
between the represented sets. If r1 ✓ r2 then we can observe s1 ✓ s2 where
s1 and s2 are translations of r1 and r2 respectively. Similarly, if r1 = r2 then
s1 = s2 is observable. For example, in Figure 12 we have already seen that
r1 ✓ r2 where
r1 = {({P,Q}, {R}), ({P,Q,R}, ;)}
and
r2 = {({P,Q}, {R}), ({P,Q,R}, ;), ({Q}, {P,R}), ({Q,R}, {P})}.
The regions r1 and r2 can be described by h{P}, ;i and h{Q}, ;i respectively.
Therefore, from Figure 12 we can observe P ✓ Q.
Definition 30 Let d be an Euler diagram and let s1?s2, where ? 2 {✓,=}, be
a set-theoretic sentence. Then s1?s2 is observable from d, denoted d s1?s2,
provided there exist regions r1 and r2 of d such that
1. r1 ? r2,
2. s1 is a translation of r1, and
3. s2 is a translation of r2.
To conclude this section, we establish that this observation relation respects
semantic entailment.
Lemma 7 Let d be an Euler diagram and let s be a set-theoretic sentence. If
d s then d semantically entails s.
7 Observational Completeness and Devoidness
The purpose of this section is to demonstrate that Euler diagrams are par-
ticularly powerful representations of information about sets, as compared to
set-theoretic sentences, from the perspectives of observational completeness
and devoidness.
30 Gem Stapleton et al.
7.1 Observational Devoidness of set-theoretic sentences
Firstly we establish that set-theoretic sentences are observationally devoid
representations of information. Referring to Definition 1 on page 10, given a
finite set of set-theoretic sentences, S, and a set-theoretic sentence s, we have:
s is observable from S, denoted S  s, i↵ there is an si in S such that si  s.
By Definition 3 on page 10, as the only set-theoretic sentences observable from
S are in S, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 1 Let S be a finite set of set-theoretic sentences. Then S is obser-
vationally devoid with respect to S✏.
Theorem 1 tells us that if we want to deduce any set-theoretic sentence
from S that is not explicitly written down in S then we must use inference
mechanisms to deduce it. In this sense, set-theoretic sentences are weak rep-
resentations of information.
7.2 Observational Completeness of Euler Diagrams
Our attention now turns to identifying conditions under which Euler diagrams
are observationally complete representations of information, relative to set-
theoretic sentences. Suppose we have a finite set of set-theoretic sentences,
S = {s1, ..., sn} and we take D = {di 2 DALL : 9si 2 S si  di}. Then,
given a single si and its associated di, any set-theoretic sentence that follows
from si, up to labels, is observable from di. In other words, by Definition 2
on page 10, {di} is observationally complete with respect to {si}L(si)✏ (i.e., the
set of set-theoretic sentences that follow semantically from {si} whose labels
are all in L(si)).
As a specific example, consider S = {s1 ⌘ P = Q, s2 ⌘ (Q \ R) = ;}
and the associated set D illustrated in Figure 5 on page 13. Whilst we can
observe P = Q and (Q \ R) = ; from D, we cannot observe the set-theoretic
sentence (P \ R) = ; from either d1 or d2, just like we cannot observe the
diagram d from d1 or d2. Thus, in this case D is not observationally complete
with respect to S. In general, if we take S to be a finite set of set-theoretic
sentences with cardinality at least two, it is not necessarily the case that
D = {d 2 DALL : 9s 2 S s  d} is observationally complete with respect
to SL✏ , where L =
S
s2S
L(s). However, we will establish that for every finite
set of set-theoretic sentences, S, there is a single Euler diagram, d, that is
observationally complete with respect to SL✏ .
To illustrate, taking S = {s1 ⌘ P ✓ Q, s2 ⌘ (Q \ R) = ;, s3 ⌘ T ✓
R} an observationally complete Euler diagram is d in Figure 13; D = {d}
is semantically equivalent to S. Here, any set-theoretic sentence, s, that is
semantically entailed by S and that is formed using only labels that are used
in set-theoretic sentences in S is observable from D; for example, taking s ⌘
(P \R) = ; we can observe s from D (although we cannot observe s from S).
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T
Fig. 13 Observational completeness.
The fact that all such statements, s, are observable from D means that D is
observationally complete with respect to S, and also with respect to all of the
set-theoretic sentences that are non-trivially semantically entailed by S, up to
the labels used.
In order to build an observationally complete diagram, d, from S, we start
by identifying, for each si in S, the Euler diagram di observable from it. In our
example, these diagrams are shown in Figure 14. Then we unify these diagrams
into a single diagram, firstly unifying d1 and d2 and secondly unifying the result
of this first operation with d3. The resulting diagram is d, as originally seen
in Figure 13.
T
T
Fig. 14 Building diagrams from set-theoretic sentences.
Definition 31 Let d1 = (L1, Z1) and d2 = (L2, Z2) be Euler diagrams. The
unification of d1 and d2, denoted d1 + d2, is an Euler diagram, d1 + d2 =
(L1 + L2, Z1 + Z2) where
1. the labels are given by L1 + L2 = L1 [ L2, and
2. the zones are given by
Z1 + Z2 = {(in [ L, out [ (L2\(L1 [ L))) : (in, out) 2 Z1 ^ L ✓ L2\L1} \
{(in [ L, out [ (L1\(L2 [ L))) : (in, out) 2 Z2 ^ L ✓ L1\L2}.
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An essential property of the unification operation is that it preserves semantics.
That is, if we unify d1 and d2 then {d1, d2} is semantically equivalent to
{d1 + d2}, captured by Lemma 8.
Lemma 8 Let d1 = (L1, Z1) and d2 = (L2, Z2) be Euler diagrams. Then
{d1, d2} is semantically equivalent to {d1 + d2}.
It is also useful to note that unification is a commutative and associative
operation. This means that the result of converting each set-theoretic sentence
in S into a diagram and then unifying them is not dependent on the order in
which this is carried out: there is a unique resulting diagram.
Lemma 9 Let d1 = (L1, Z1), d2 = (L2, Z2) and d3 = (L3, Z3) be Euler dia-
grams. Then
1. d1 + d2 = d2 + d1 (the operation + is commutative), and
2. (d1 + d2) + d3 = d1 + (d2 + d3) (the operation + is associative).
Definition 32 Let S = {s1, ..., sn} be a finite set of set-theoretic sentences.
The Euler diagram d = d1 + ...+ dn, where for each i we have si  di, is the
unified diagram for S. The unified diagram for S is denoted dS .
The diagram dS is semantically equivalent to S.
Lemma 10 Let S be a finite set of set-theoretic sentences. Then S and {dS}
are semantically equivalent.
Fig. 15 Observing set-theoretic sentences.
To complete this section, we show that the unified diagram, dS , for S is
observationally complete. The proof of this result starts by showing that for
any set-expression formed over the labels in L =
S
s2S
L(s) there is a region in
dS that translates to s. Then given a set-theoretic sentence, say s0 ⌘ s1 ✓ s2,
in SL✏ , we know that for both set-expressions s1 and s2 there are regions, r1
and r2 respectively, in dS that translate to s1 and s2 (the same is true if,
instead, s0 ⌘ s1 = s2). Our task is to show that r1 ✓ r2, for then we can
observe that s1 ✓ s2.
To illustrate, consider S = {P \ Q = ;, R ✓ Q}. The unified diagram
for S is shown as dS in Figure 15. The set-theoretic sentence (Q\R) ✓ Q
is in SL✏ and is formed from two set-expressions, namely (Q\R) and Q. The
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regions for these two set-expressions are also shown in Figure 15 in the middle
two diagrams (we use shading to point them out). Comparing these shaded
regions, it is easy to see that r1 ✓ r2. Therefore, since r1 translates to Q\R
and r2 translates to Q, we have shown that (Q\R) ✓ Q is observable from dS .
Similarly, P [Q is a translation of the shaded region in the rightmost diagram.
Therefore, we can also observe that R ✓ (P [Q) from dS .
Theorem 2 Let S be a finite set of set-theoretic sentences. Then {dS} is
observationally complete with respect to SL✏ where L =
S
s2S
L(s).
Theorem 2 tells us that a single Euler diagram is a powerful representation
of information as compared to using set-theoretic sentences. This is because
every set-theoretic sentence that must be inferred from S, up to labels, can
simply be observed from the Euler diagram.
8 Observational Advantages of Euler Diagrams
As discussed in Section 2, diagrams often have a number of observational
advantages over sentential notations when representing information. Using our
theory of observation and the results in Section 7, we are able to characterize
these advantages. In particular, we have seen the following:
1. Theorem 1: a set of set-theoretic sentences, S, is observationally devoid
with respect to SL✏ , where L =
S
s2S
L(s), and
2. Theorem 2: the (set containing the) unified Euler diagram d is observa-
tionally complete with respect to SL✏ .
In particular, any statement  , be it a set-theoretic sentence or Euler
diagram, that is semantically entailed by S and not in S must be inferred from
S. By contrast,   can be observed from d. In the specific case of set-theoretic
sentences compared to diagrams, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3 Let S = {s1, ..., sn} be a finite set of set-theoretic sentences.
Then D = {dS} has maximal observational advantage over S given SL✏ where
L =
S
s2S
L(s).
Thus, a single Euler diagram is the most e cacious representation of the
information in S. Consequently, we showed that a single diagram to represent
information has observational advantages compared to using sentential sys-
tems. By contrast, a set of diagrams that does not include the unified diagram
need not have maximal observational advantage over S.
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9 Discussion and Conclusion
Theoretically characterizing relative advantages of representations of informa-
tion allows us to choose our representation in an informed way. Through the
notion of observation introduced in this paper, we are able to provide such a
characterization. In particular, it is advantageous if a representation of infor-
mation allows us to simply observe other statements of interest to be true. By
contrast, if we cannot observe the statement – yet it does indeed follow from
the given representation – then this is a disadvantage of that representation.
If one representation of information, r1, has such an advantage and another,
r2, has this as a disadvantage then r1 has an observational advantage over r2.
Through demonstrating how to apply our theory of observation and obser-
vational advantages to set theory and Euler diagrams, we have been able to
establish the following:
1. Given a finite set of set-theoretic sentences, S, no other set-theoretic sen-
tences can be observed from S; thus, S is observationally devoid.
2. Given an Euler diagram, dS , constructed from S, every set-theoretic sen-
tence that follows from S can be observed from dS ; thus, dS is observa-
tionally complete.
These two characterizations of what can (or cannot) be observed allow us to
understand that dS is a significantly more e cacious representation of infor-
mation than S: it has maximal observational advantage over S. From a theo-
retical perspective, these benefits mean that using dS is desirable: dS makes
informational content readily available, in the sense of observability, to end-
users; the discussion below on net cognitive value considers this point from
the perspective of human cognition. As there are infinitely many set-theoretic
sentences that are semantically entailed by S, the benefits of Euler diagrams
over set theory are numerous. Linking back to the insight that a diagram is
sometimes worth 10,000 words, our formal theory of observation and observa-
tional advantage has allowed us to prove that a diagram is sometimes worth
infinitely many set-theoretic sentences.
In our view, this result captures the kernel in which diagrammatic represen-
tations facilitate our inference and thus excel over sentential representations.
By putting this result in a larger perspective, we may expect to gain a fuller
understanding of the relative advantages of one choice of representation over
another where diagrams are one of the options. We pose two general questions
that lead to extensions of our research.
The first question is concerned with the generalizability of our result.
When, generally, do we find a unifying diagram that is observationally com-
plete with respect to a set of sentential representations? It clearly depends
on the choice of our diagrammatic and sentential notations, and so on the
kinds of information we want to express with our notations. In this paper,
we have investigated the case where we are only interested in expressing the
subset relation and the equality relation among sets. What happens when we
are also interested in the expression of non-subsetness and non-equality? For
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example, we may wish to express P * Q and P 6= R. Diagrammatically, this
can be expressed by augmenting Euler diagrams with ⌦-sequences, originally
introduced by Peirce [15] and further explored by Shin [20]; ⌦-sequences assert
the non-emptiness of sets. Figure 16 demonstrates how to express P * Q and
P 6= R. It will be interesting to determine whether and when these augmented
Euler diagrams still have maximal observational advantages.
Fig. 16 Augmenting Euler diagrams with ⌦ to assert non-emptiness of sets.
Diagrammatic notations need not always have maximal observational ad-
vantages over sentential notations, and it is important to investigate the syn-
tactic and semantic conditions of a pair of notations under which this happens
— that is, we should identify when the diagrammatic notation is guaranteed to
have a unifying diagram over any set of statements in the sentential notation.
This way we will see more clearly how, exactly, diagrammatic notations work
in the kernel cases.
Still widening our perspective, the second question is concerned with the
net cognitive value of observability. Observing statements from sets of state-
ments comes with cognitive cost, just as inferring statements from sets of
statements does. For example, d1 in Figure 17 is the unified diagram of the
set of statements:
S = {(P \V ) = ;, (P \T ) = ;, (Q\V ) = ;, (Q\T ) = ;, (R\T ) = ;, T ✓ V },
and hence every set-theoretic sentence semantically entailed by S is observable
from d1 as far as it is concerned with the labels {P,Q,R, T, V } only. In par-
T
V
Fig. 17 Cost of observing a statement from a diagram.
ticular, ((P\R) \ ((V \R)\T )) = ; is observable, and since it is not a member
of S, it is an observational advantage of the diagram d1 over S. Observing
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this statement, however, requires one to recognize the two regions in d1 corre-
sponding to the set-expressions (P\R) and ((V \R)\T ) as well as their spatial
relationship, while inferring it from S seems to take only a few short inference
steps: trivially, (P\R) ✓ P and ((V \R)\T ) ✓ V , so ((P\R)\ ((V \R)\T )) = ;
follows from (P \ V ) = ;.
Thus, the net cognitive value of a statement observable from a diagram de-
pends both on the cost of recognizing relevant diagrammatic elements and their
spatial relationships, and also on the set of available observational operations
with which one may reach that statement from a set of set-theoretic sen-
tences9. Therefore, our study of observational advantages, conducted purely
on a logical basis, must be connected in the future to psychological and compu-
tational models of the perceptual as well as observational operations available
to users.
With such a connection, we may expect to compare, more generally, two
semantically equivalent sets of representations, where each has observational
advantages over the other. To compute these advantages, we will need to eval-
uate the observational as well as the perceptual costs of each representation
(with respect to the set ⌃✏ of information relevant to the cognitive task at
hand). Our logical approach presented in this paper that formalises the dis-
tinction between what is observable and what must be inferred from a given
set of representations is the crucial first step in such a connected approach to
the general representation comparison problem.
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A Proofs of the Lemmas
Lemma 1 Let ⌃ and ⌃ˆ be finite, semantically equivalent sets of statements.
Let   be an observational advantage of ⌃ˆ given ⌃. Then ⌃ semantically entails
 .
Proof Since   is an observational advantage, it can be observed from ⌃ˆ. This
means that there is a statement,  ˆ, in ⌃ˆ such that   can be observed from
 ˆ. Therefore, since observation relations must respect semantic entailment,  ˆ
semantically entails  . This implies that ⌃ˆ also semantically entails  . Since
⌃ˆ and ⌃ are semantically equivalent, ⌃ must also semantically entail  . ⇤
Lemma 2 Let s1 and s2 be set-theoretic sentences. If s1  s2 then s1 seman-
tically entails s2.
Proof This result trivially holds since s1 and s2 are the same set-theoretic
sentence. ⇤
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Lemma 3 Let s be a set-expression and let L be a set of labels such that
L(s) ✓ L. Let I = (4, ) be an interpretation. Then  (s) =  (T (s, L)).
Proof The proof is by induction over the depth of s in the inductive construc-
tion of set-expressions. There are three base cases:
– Case 1: s ⌘ ;. In this case, T (s, L) = ;. Trivially  (s) =  (T (s, L)) and
we are done.
– Case 2: s ⌘ U . In this case, T (s, L) = {(in, out) 2 Z : in [ out = L}. We
know that  (U) = 4, by definition. Therefore, we must show  (T (s, L)) =
4. Firstly, it is obvious that  (T (s, L)) ✓ 4. Let e 2 4. We show that
e 2  (in, out) for some (in, out) 2 T (s, L). To begin, we note that for each
l 2 L, either e 2  (l) or e 62  (l). Define in = {l 2 L : e 2  (l)} and
out = {l 2 L : e 62  (l)}. Clearly, (in, out) 2 T (s, L). Moreover,
e 2
\
l2in
 (l) and e 2
\
l2out
 (l).
So
e 2
\
l2in
 (l) \
\
l2out
 (l).
Therefore, e 2  (in, out), so e 2  (T (s, L)). Hence  (T (s, L)) = 4, as
required.
– Case 3: s 2 L. In this case, T (s, L) = {(in, out) 2 T (U,L) : s 2 in}.
We must show  (s) =  (T (s, L)). Let e 2 4 and, to show that  (s) ✓
 (T (s, L)), suppose that e 2  (s). We identify a zone in T (s, L) whose
interpretation under  includes e. As in Case 2, for each l 2 L, either
e 2  (l) or e 62  (l). Define in = {l 2 L : e 2  (l)} and out = {l 2
L : e 62  (l)}. Clearly, in includes s (since e 2  (s)) and, therefore,
(in, out) 2 T (s, L). Moreover,
e 2
\
l2in
 (l) and e 2
\
l2out
 (l).
From this it follows that
e 2
\
l2in
 (l) \
\
l2out
 (l) =  (in, out).
Therefore, e 2  (in, out), so e 2  (T (s, L)). Thus,  (s) ✓  (T (s, L)).
To show that  (T (s, L)) ✓  (s), suppose instead that e 2  (T (s, L)).
Choose the zone (in, out) in T (s, L) such that e 2  (in, out). By definition,
 (in, out) =
\
l2in
 (l) \
\
l2out
 (l).
Since (in, out) 2 T (s, L) it follows that s 2 in, so we deduce that
 (in, out) =
\
l2in
 (l) \
\
l2out
 (l) \  (s).
Therefore  (in, out) ✓  (s), so e 2  (s). Hence  (T (s, L)) ✓  (s) and it
follows that  (T (s, L)) =  (s), as required.
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Hence the three base cases hold.
Suppose for any set-expression, s, at depth n in the inductive construction
of set-expressions, that  (s) =  (T (s, L)). Let s0 be a set-expression at depth
n+ 1. Then either s0 ⌘ (s1 ? s2) or s0 ⌘ s1. In the former case, by assumption
we have  (s1) =  (T (s1, L)) and  (s2) =  (T (s2, L)). Therefore,
 (s0) =  (s1) ?  (s1)
=  (T (s1, L)) ?  (T (s2, L))
=  (T (s1, L) ? T (s2, L))
=  (T (s0, L)).
The case where s0 ⌘ s1 is similar. Hence,  (s) =  (T (s, L)), for all set-
expression s. ⇤
Lemma 4 Let s be a set-theoretic sentence and let d be an Euler diagram. If
s d then s semantically entails d.
Proof Let I = (4, ) be a model for s. We must show that I is a model for
d = (L,Z). There are two cases.
– Case 1: s ⌘ s1 ✓ s2. By Lemma 3, we know that  (s1) =  (T (s1, L)) and
 (s2) =  (T (s2, L)). Since I is a model for s, we further know that
 (T (s1, L)) ✓  (T (s2, L)). (1)
Now, to show that I is a model for d, we must show that every missing
zone of d represents the empty set under  . Let z be a missing zone of d.
Then, by Definition 27,
z 2 T (s1, L)\T (s2, L). (2)
If  (z) 6= ; then (1) implies that there is a zone, z0, in T (s2, L(d)) such that
 (z) \  (z0) 6= ;. It is easy to show that distinct zones in Z(d) [MZ(d)
represent disjoint sets, so it follows that z = z0. But then z 2 T (s2, L(d)),
contradicting (2). Thus,  (z) = ;. Hence I is a model for d. Therefore s
semantically entails d.
– Case 2: s ⌘ s1 = s2. The proof is similar to Case 1.
Hence, in either case, s semantically entails d. ⇤
Lemma 5 Let d be an Euler diagram. Every region of d has a description in
d.
Proof If r = ; then ; is a description of r. Otherwise, r 6= ;, so r is of the
form r = {(in1, out1), ..., (inn, outn)}. Each zone (ini, out i) is described by
hini, out ii. Then r has description
(...((hin1, out1i [ hin2, out2i) [ hin3, out3i)... [ hinn, outni)
as required. ⇤
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Lemma 6 Let d be an Euler diagram and let r be a region of d. Let s be a
set-expression that is a translation of r in d. Let I = (U, ) be a model for d.
Then  (s) =  (r).
Proof Our proof proceeds by induction on the depth of region descriptions in
the inductive construction of such descriptions. There are two base cases.
– Case 1: R = ;. In this case, r = ; and s ⌘ ;, so  (r) = ; =  (s).
– Case 2: R = hIN ,OUT i. There are four subcases.
(a) IN [OUT = ;. In this case, s ⌘ U . Moreover,
hIN ,OUT i = Z(d).
It is easy to show that, in any model for d,  (Z(d)) = 4. Since  (s) =
 (U) = 4 we are done.
(b) IN [OUT = {l}, where l 2 IN . In this case, s ⌘ l. Moreover,
hIN ,OUT i = {(in, out) 2 Z(d) : l 2 in}.
Clearly  (hIN ,OUT i) ✓  (l). Let e 2  (l). Then there is a zone,
(in, L\in), in Z(d)[MZ(d) such that e 2  (in, L\in). From this, it fol-
lows that l 62 L\in, so l 2 in. Moreover, since
e 2  (in, L\in), we see that  (in, L\in) 6= ;. Thus, the zone (in, L\in)
is not missing from d. Therefore, (in, L\in) is
in hIN ,OUT i. Hence e 2  (hIN ,OUT i). In conclusion,
 (hIN ,OUT i) =  (l) =  (s).
(c) IN [OUT = {l}, where l 2 OUT . This case is similar to (b).
(d) |IN[OUT |   2. In this case, there exist two disjoint, non-empty subsets
L1 and L2 of IN [OUT such that
(a) L1 [ L2 = IN [OUT ,
(b) there exists a set-expression, s1, that is a translation of
hIN \L1,OUT\L1i,
(c) there exists a set-expression, s2, that is a translation of
hIN \L2,OUT\L2i,
and
(d) s ⌘ (s1 \ s2).
Noting that IN = (IN \L1) [ (IN \L2) and OUT = (OUT\L1) [
(OUT\L2), it follows that
hIN ,OUT i = hIN \L1,OUT\L1i \ hIN \L2,OUT\L2i.
Therefore
 (hIN ,OUT i) =  (hIN \L1,OUT\L1i) \  (hIN \L2,OUT\L2i).
It can be shown, using induction, that  (s1) = hIN \L1,OUT\L1i,
hIN \L2,OUT\L2i. Therefore,  (hIN ,OUT i) =  (s1) \  (s2) =  (s),
as required.
What Makes an E↵ective Representation of Information 5
Assume for any region description, R, at depth n, and for any region, r, with
that description, it is the case that  (r) =  (s). For our inductive step we
again have two cases. Let r0 be a region with a description, R0, at depth n+1.
– Case 1: R0 = R1 ?R2. Then there exist regions r1 and r2 with descriptions
R1 and R2 respectively such that r0 = r1 ? r2. Then s0, the translation of
r1 ? r2, is s0 ⌘ (s1 ? s2) where s1 and s2 are translations of R1 and R2
respectively. By assumption,  (r1) =  (s1) and  (r2) =  (s2). Therefore,
since  (r) =  (r1) ?  (r2) we deduce that  (r) =  (s1) ?  (s2).
– Case 2: R0 = R1. Then there exists a region r1 with description R1 such
that r = r1. Then s0 ⌘ s1 where s1 is a translation of R1. By assumption,
 (r1) =  (s1). Therefore,  (r) =  (r1) =  (s1).
Hence,  (r) =  (s) in all models for d. ⇤
Lemma 7 Let d be an Euler diagram and let s be a set-theoretic sentence. If
d s then d semantically entails s.
Proof Let I = (4, ) be a model for d. Let s be a set-theoretic sentence
observable from d. Then s ⌘ s1 ✓ s2 or s ⌘ s1 = s2. In either case, there
exist regions r1 and r2 such that s1 and s2 are the translations of r1 and r2
respectively. When s ⌘ s1 ✓ s2, we know that r1 ✓ r2. Therefore,  (r1) ✓
 (r2). By Lemma 6,  (s1) ✓  (s2). The proof is similar when s ⌘ s1 = s2. ⇤
Lemma 8 Let d1 = (L1, Z1) and d2 = (L2, Z2) be Euler diagrams. Then
{d1, d2} is semantically equivalent to {d1 + d2}.
Proof Let I = (4, ) be an interpretation. Suppose I is a model for {d1, d2}.
Then I is a model for both d1 and d2. We need to show that I is a model for
d1 + d2. Let (in, out) 2 MZ (d1 + d2). Suppose, for a proof by contradiction,
that  (in, out) 6= ;. Let e 2  (in, out). Since I models d1, there is a zone,
z, in Z(d1) such that e 2  (z). Choose such a zone, say (in1, out1). Since
in1 [ out1 = L1 ✓ L1 [ L2 = in [ out , and both (in, out) and (in1, out1)
represent a set containing e, we have
in1 ✓ in and out1 ✓ out .
This implies that there exists an L where L ✓ (L2\L1) such that
(in, out) = (in1 [ L, out1 [ (L2\(L1 [ L)))
Similarly, there is a zone, (in2, out2) in Z(d2) and an L0 such that
(in, out) = (in2 [ L0, out2 [ (L1\(L2 [ L0)))
From this, it follows that (in, out) 2 Z1 + Z2 = Z(d1 + d2), which is a con-
tradiction. Hence our assumption that  (in, out) 6= ; was false. Thus, zones
missing from d1 + d2 represent empty sets. Hence I is a model for d1 + d2.
For the converse, suppose that I is a model for d1 + d2. We must show
that I models d1 and d2. First, we show that I models d1. Let (in, out) be a
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zone in MZ (d1). We must show  (in, out) = ;. Suppose that  (in, out) 6= ;
and choose e 2  (in, out). This implies there is a zone, say (in1+2, out1+2),
in Z1 + Z2 (i.e. in Z(d1 + d2)) such that e 2  (in1+2, out1+2). Now, because
(in1+2, out1+2) is in Z1+Z2, there exists a zone, say (in1, out1), in Z1 = Z(d1)
and a set of labels, L, such that
(in1+2, out1+2) = (in1 [ L, out1 [ (L2\(L1 [ L))).
We therefore know that
e 2  (in1 [ L, out1 [ (L2\(L1 [ L)))
=
\
l2in1[L
 (l) \
\
l2out1[(L2\(L1[L))
 (l).
Therefore,
e 2
\
l2in1[L
 (l) ✓
\
l2in1
 (l)
and
e 2
\
l2out1[(L2\(L1[L))
 (l) ✓
\
l2out1
 (l).
This implies that
e 2
\
l2in1
 (l) \
\
l2out1
=  (in1, out1).
Since distinct zones in Z(d1) [MZ (d1) represent disjoint sets, it follows that
(in1, out1) = (in, out).
But (in1, out1) is in Z(d1), meaning that (in, out) is in Z(d1) and is not in
MZ (d1), which is a contradiction. Therefore, it cannot be that  (in, out) 6= ;,
so it follows that  (in, out) = ;. Since (in, out) was an arbitrary missing zone,
we deduce that I is a model for d1. The case for d2 is similar. Hence, I models
both d1 and d2. Therefore, {d1, d2} and {d1+ d2} are semantically equivalent.
⇤
Before we prove Lemma 9, we establish some properties of zones in unified
diagrams, presented here in a new lemma.
Lemma 11 Let d1 = (L1, Z1) and d2 = (L2, Z2) be Euler diagrams.
1. If (inz, outz) 2 Z1+Z2 then (inz\L1, outz\L1) 2 Z1 and (inz\L2, outz\
L2) 2 Z2.
2. If (inz, outz) is a zone such that
(a) inz [ outz = L1 [ L2,
(b) (inz \ L1, outz \ L1) 2 Z1 and
(c) (inz \ L2, outz \ L2) 2 Z2
then (inz, outz) 2 Z1 + Z2.
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Proof For the first part of the proof we begin by showing that (inz\L1, outz\
L1) 2 Z1. Since (inz, outz) 2 Z1 + Z2 we know that
(inz, outz) 2 {(in [ L, out [ (L2\(L1 [ L))) : (in, out) 2 Z1 ^ L ✓ L2\L1}.
Choose (in, out) 2 Z1 and L such that
(inz, outz) = (in [ L, out [ (L2\(L1 [ L))).
Then inz = in [ L, so
inz \ L1 = (in [ L) \ L1.
We know that L ✓ L2\L1, so L \ L1 = ;. Therefore,
inz \ L1 = in \ L1.
Moreover, we also know that in ✓ L1, because (in, out) 2 Z1, thus:
inz \ L1 = in.
It can also be shown that outz \ L1 = out . Therefore,
(inz \ L1, outz \ L1) = (in, out) 2 Z1
as required. Similarly, (inz \ L2, outz \ L2) 2 Z2, completing the first part of
the proof.
For the second part, we assume that there is a zone (inz, outz) such that
(a) inz [ outz = L1 [ L2,
(b) (inz \ L1, outz \ L1) 2 Z1 and
(c) (inz \ L2, outz \ L2) 2 Z2
We show that (inz, outz) 2 Z1 + Z2. Given (inz \ L1, outz \ L1), we take
L = (L2\L1) \ inz. Then
(inz \ L1) [ L = (inz \ L1) [ ((L2\L1) \ inz)
= ((inz \ L1) [ inz) \ ((inz \ L1) [ (L2\L1))
= inz \ ((inz [ (L2\L1)) \ (L1 [ (L2\L1)))
= inz \ ((inz [ (L2\L1)) \ (L1 [ L2))
= inz \ (inz [ (L2\L1))
= inz.
That is, (inz \L1)[L = inz. It can also be shown that outz [ (L2\(L1[L)) =
outz. Therefore, since L = (L2\L1) \ inz ✓ L2\L1, we have
(inz, outz) 2 {(in [ L0, out [ (L2\(L1 [ L0))) : (in, out) 2 Z1 ^ L0 ✓ L2\L1}.
Likewise,
(inz, outz) 2 {(in [ L0, out [ (L1\(L2 [ L0))) : (in, out) 2 Z2 ^ L0 ✓ L1\L2}.
Therefore (inz, outz) 2 Z1 + Z2, as required. ⇤
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Lemma 9 Let d1 = (L1, Z1), d2 = (L2, Z2) and d3 = (L3, Z3) be Euler dia-
grams. Then
1. d1 + d2 = d2 + d1 (the operation + is commutative), and
2. (d1 + d2) + d3 = d1 + (d2 + d3) (the operation + is associative).
Proof The commutativity of + is obvious. Regarding associativity, firstly it
is trivial that (d1 + d2) + d3 and d1 + (d2 + d3) have the same label set,
namely L(d1)[L(d2)[L(d3). Let (in, out) be a zone of (d1+ d2)+ d3, that is
(in, out) 2 (Z1 +Z2) +Z3. We show that (in, out) is a zone of d1 + (d2 + d3),
that is (in, out) 2 Z1 + (Z2 + Z3). By Lemma 11, Part 1, we deduce that
– (in \ L1, out \ L1) 2 Z1,
– (in \ L2, out \ L2) 2 Z2, and
– (in \ L3, out \ L3) 2 Z3.
Define
inz = (in \ L2) [ (in \ L3) = in \ (L2 [ L3)
and
outz = (out \ L2) [ (out \ L3) = out \ (L2 [ L3).
Then
inz [ outz = (in \ (L2 [ L3)) [ (out \ (L2 [ L3))
= (in [ out) \ (L2 [ L3)
= L2 [ L3 since L2 [ L3 ✓ in [ out .
Therefore, (inz, outz) is a zone where:
(a) inz [ outz = L2 [ L3,
(b) (inz \ L2, outz \ L2) 2 Z2 and
(c) (inz \ L3, outz \ L3) 2 Z3.
By Lemma 11, Part 2, we deduce that (inz, outz) 2 Z2 + Z3. Now we have
(in, out) is a zone where:
(a) in [ out = L1 [ (L2 [ L3),
(b) (in \ L1, out \ L1) 2 Z1 and
(c) (inz, outz) = (in \ (L2 [ L3), out \ (L2 [ L3)) 2 Z2 + Z3.
By Lemma 11, Part 2, we deduce that (in, out) 2 Z1 + (Z2 + Z3). Therefore
(Z1+Z2)+Z3 ✓ Z1+(Z2+Z3). The proof that Z1+(Z2+Z3) ✓ (Z1+Z2)+Z3
is similar. Therefore, (d1 + d2) + d3 = d1 + (d2 + d3). Hence + is associative,
as required. ⇤
Lemma 10 Let S be a finite set of set-theoretic sentences. Then S and {dS}
are semantically equivalent.
Proof By Lemma 4, we know that for each s in S, s semantically entails d,
where s d. Given such as s and d, we now show that d semantically entails
s. Let I = (4, ) be a model for d. There are two cases.
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– Case 1: s ⌘ s1 ✓ s2. In this case, we know that
MZ (d) = T (s1, L(d))\T (s2, L(d)).
Since I is a model for d, it is the case that
 (T (s1, L(d))\T (s2, L(d))) = ;.
This implies
 (T (s1, L(d)))\ (T (s2, L(d))) = ;
from which it follows that
 (T (s1, L(d))) ✓  (T (s2, L(d))).
By Lemma 3,  (s1) =  (T (s1, L(d))) and  (s2) =  (T (s2, L(d))), so
 (s1) ✓  (s2). Therefore I models s ⌘ s1 ✓ s2.
– Case 2: s ⌘ s1 = s2. Noting that s1 = s2 is equivalent to s1 ✓ s2 and
s2 ✓ s1, this case is similar to Case 1.
In both cases, we have shown that I models s, so d semantically entails s.
Therefore s and d are semantically equivalent. Thus, given S = {s1, ..., sn}
and the set of diagrams, D = {d1, ..., dn} observable from the set-theoretic
sentences in S, we know that D is semantically equivalent to S. By Lemma 8,
{d1+ ...+dn} = {dS} is semantically equivalent to D. Hence S is semantically
equivalent to {dS}. ⇤
B Proofs of the Theorems
Theorem 1 Let S be a finite set of set-theoretic sentences. Then S is obser-
vationally devoid with respect to S✏.
Proof Let s be in S✏. Then s is properly semantically entailed by S. This
means that s is not in S. The only statements observable from S are those in
S. Therefore s is not in O(S). Hence S is observationally devoid with respect
to S✏. That is, S✏ \O(S) = ; as required by Definition 3. ⇤
Theorem 2 Let S be a finite set of set-theoretic sentences. Then {dS} is
observationally complete with respect to SL✏ where L =
S
s2S
L(s).
Proof We start by showing that for each set-expression, s, where L(s) ✓ L =
L(dS), there is a region in dS that translates to s. This part of the proof is by
induction on the depth of s in the inductive construction of set-expressions.
There are three base cases:
– Case 1: s ⌘ ;. Set r = ; and we are done.
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– Case 2: s ⌘ U . Here, take r = Z(dS). In this case,
r = {(in, out) 2 Z(dS) : ; ✓ in ^ ; ✓ out}.
Therefore, r is the zonal region h;, ;i. Therefore r has description h;, ;i
and, so, translates to U as required.
– Case 3: s ⌘ l for some l 2 L. Take r to be the largest set of zones in Z(dS)
such that, for each (in, out) in r, l 2 in. That is
r = {(in, out) 2 Z(dS) : l 2 in}
= {(in, out) 2 Z(dS) : {l} ✓ in ^ ; ✓ out}.
Then, since l 2 L(dS), r has description h{l}, ;i and, so, translates to s ⌘ l.
Assume for all set-expressions, s, at depth n in the inductive construction,
where L(s) ✓ L(dS) that such an r exists. Let s0 be a set-expression at depth
n+ 1 where L(s0) ✓ L(dS). Then either s0 ⌘ (s1 ? s2), where ? 2 {\,[, \}, or
s0 ⌘ s1, for some set-expressions s1 and s2 at depth n. By assumption, there
are regions r1 and r2 in d that translate to s1 and s2 respectively. We have
the following cases:
– Case i: s ⌘ (s1 ? s2). By the inductive assumption, for the set-expressions
s1 there exists a region, r1 in dS that translates to s1. Similarly, such an
r2 exists for s2. Further, we know that r1 and r2 translate to s1 and s2 via
some descriptions, say R1 and R2 of r1 and r2 respectively. Since the set of
regions in any diagram is closed under union and intersection, the region
r = r1 ? r2 is in dS . By Definition 29, the region r has description R1 ?R2
and, using R1 ?R2 and our inductive assumption, we see that r translates
to s via R1 ?R2 as required.
– Case ii: s ⌘ s1. Noting that set of regions in any diagram is closed under
complement, the argument is similar to Case i.
Therefore, every set-expression, s, where L(s) ✓ L(dS) has a region, r, in dS
translates to s.
For the next part of the proof, let s be a set-theoretic sentence that is in SL✏ .
We must show that s is observable from dS . By the construction of dS , we first
note that L = L(dS). Let I be a model for dS . By Lemma 10, dS semantically
entails s so I also models s. Now, either s ⌘ s1 ✓ s2 or s ⌘ s1 = s2. We
consider these two cases.
– Case A: s ⌘ s1 ✓ s2. We have just seen that there are regions, r1 and r2
in dS that translate to s1 and s2 respectively. We show that r1 ✓ r2. Since
I models s1 ✓ s2, we know that  (s1) ✓  (s2). By Lemma 6, this implies
that  (r1) ✓  (r2). If there were a zone, z, in r1 that is not in r2 then
there would be a model for dS in which  (r1) 6✓  (r2). But such a model
for dS would not satisfy s1 ✓ s2. Therefore no such zone can exist. Thus,
r1 ✓ r2. We have:
1. r1 ✓ r2,
2. s1 is a translation of r1, and
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3. s2 is a translation of r2.
Therefore, s1 ✓ r2 is observable from dS .
– Case B: s ⌘ s1 = s2. Noting that s1 = s2 is semantically equivalent to
s1 ✓ s2 and s2 ✓ s1, the proof is similar to Case A.
Hence, in either case, s is observable from dS . Therefore, every set-theoretic
sentence in SL✏ is observable from dS . Hence, by Definition 2, dS is observa-
tionally complete with respect to SL✏ . ⇤
Theorem 3 Let S = {s1, ..., sn} be a finite set of set-theoretic sentences.
Then D = {dS} has maximal observational advantage over S given SL✏ where
L =
S
s2S
L(s).
Proof By Lemma 10, S and {dS} are semantically equivalent. By Theorem 1,
S is observationally devoid with respect to S✏. Since SL✏ ✓ S✏, S is also obser-
vationally devoid with respect to SL✏ . By Theorem 2, {dS} is observationally
complete with respect to SL✏ . Therefore, {dS} has maximal observational ad-
vantage over S given SL✏ . ⇤
